Manning, USMCĪbstract: As the United States faces a rise in credible antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, the U.S. government.įeasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative
Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. The contents of this article reflect the author’s own personal views alone and are not necessarily endorsed by the U.S. He is an affiliated scholar of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, which provided valuable research assistance in the preparation of this article. He earned a BA in political science from Davidson College in Davidson, NC, an MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and an MA in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Keywords:Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), China, seapower, naval history, naval strategy, People’s Liberation Army, Qing DynastyĪndrew Rhodes is a career civil servant who has worked on Asia-Pacific affairs in a variety of analytic, advisory, and staff positions across the Department of Defense and the interagency. Careful consideration of the Sino-Japanese War can support two priority focus areas from the Commandant’s Planning Guidance: “warfighting” and “education and training.” Chinese authors assess that the future requires that China inculcate an awareness of the maritime domain in its people, that it build institutions that can sustain seapower, and that, at the operational level, it actively seeks to contest and gain sea control far from shore. A review of recent Chinese publications highlights several consistent themes that underpin Chinese thinking about naval strategy.
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The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 remains a cautionary tale full of salient lessons for future conflict. Salient Lessons of the Sino-Japanese War for Future Naval WarfareĪbstract: American officers considering the role of the sea Services in a future war must understand the history and organizational culture of the Chinese military and consider how these factors shape the Chinese approach to naval strategy and operations. Flynn runs the website, which is dedicated to examining the new conditions shaping global conflict. He specializes in the evolution of warfare and has written on topics such as preemptive war, revolutionary war, borders and frontiers, and militarization in the cyber domain. Flynn, PhD, serves as professor of war studies at Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. Keywords: naval power, seapower, Rear Admiral Horatio Nelson, Napoleon, Trafalgar, continental system This article looks at the early conceptualization of a Center for Applied Creativity (CAC), the organizational starts and stalls, the thoughts about goals and organization that came together for the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity, and finally the initial years of its activity.
The Marine Corps has long valued innovation and creativity, but the impetus to establish such a center had its origins in the decennial accreditation process of MCU by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC). The conception, birth, assignment of permanent staff, funding, and now-robust schedule of activities of the Krulak Center came after some years of gestation, providing a case study of organizational change. NAVAL INTEGRATION AND THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFAREĪbstract: On 29 March 2019, a ceremony at Marine Corps University (MCU) marked the opening and full operational capability of the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity.
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